

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-10 SS-20 ACDA-19 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 EB-11 DRC-01 /175 W
----- 067474

R 231800Z NOV 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2844

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

S E C R E T USNATO 5672

E. O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-81

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: CONTINUING UK CRITICISM OF STABILIZING MEASURES

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

REF: USNATO 5522

1. UK CONTINUES TO TAKE POSITION THAT RAPID ACTION ON STABILIZING MEASURES IS PREMATURE, AND THAT ALLIES SHOULD NOT AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO U.S. PROPOSED MEASURES UNTIL DETAILS OF EACH ARE THOROUGHLY EXAMINED BY ALLIES. DURING NOVEMBER 23 MBFR WORKING GROUP MEETING, UK REP (SMITH) DREW ON PARTS OF DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE AIMED AT PREVENTING FORWARDING TO SPC OF WORKING PAPER ON MILITARY/TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF STABILIZING MEASURES RECENTLY PROPOSED BY U.S., FRG AND UK. INSTRUCTIONS ARE OBVIOUS IMPLICATION OF HIGHLY RESERVED UK POSITION ON STABILIZING MEASURES AS SET FORTH BY UK SPC REP ON NOVEMBER 15 (REFTEL).

2. FOLLOWING WORKING GROUP MEETING, UK REP PASSED COPY OF
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HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO U.S. REP. TEXT FOLLOWS:

MBFR: CONSTRAINTS: US PROPOSALS

1. AT THE MEETING IN THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO DISCUSS THE DRAFT REPORT BY THE STAFF GROUP ON STABILISING MEASURES, YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS AS APPROPRIATE: A) NOW THAT WE NO LONGER FACE THE IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT TO PRODUCE WORDING FOR THE MEMORANDUM ON THE FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL, WE HAVE RATHER MORE TIME TO STUDY THIS DIFFICULT PROBLEM IN DETAIL: B) WE THINK THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOW DEVOTE ITSELF TO PRODUCING TEXTS SUITABLE FOR TABLING IN VIENNA. IN ADDITION TO OUR DOUBTS ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE US PROPOSALS, THE LANGUAGE IN WHICH THEY ARE APPROVED (SIC) IS SOMEWHAT OBSCURE, AND HARDLY SUITABLE FOR PUTTING TO THE RUSSIANS: C) WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE PROPOSALS NOW ON THE TABLE CAN BE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE UNTIL THE TRICKY DETAILS HAVE BEEN PROPERLY EXAMINED. THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF THE MEASURES CANNOT BE DIVORCED FROM THE TECHNICAL DETAIL. WE THEREFORE HOPE THAT THE WORKING GROUP WILL RESERVE ITS APPROVAL: D) WE BELIEVE THAT NO FINAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES IS POSSIBLE UNTIL SACEUR HAS EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS ON THE DETAILED APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED MEASURES.

2. THE FOLLOWING ARE OUR MORE DETAILED COMMENTS.

3. IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE MBFR WORKING GROUP DRAFT WHETHER IT SUPPORTS THE APPLICATION OF MEASURES II AND IV SOLELY TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR IN PHASE I OR THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. YOU KNOW, WE WISH TO AVOID THESE THREE MEASURES BEING APPLIED TO EUROPEAN FORCES. BUT IN WHAT FOLLOWS WE ARE COMMENTING PRIMARILY ON THE MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSALS, RATHER THAN ON THEIR WIDER POLITICO-MILITARY IMPLICATIONS, ON WHICH OUR OBJECTIONS ARE PRIMARILY BASED.

4. THE US PAPER SUGGESTS THAT MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES WOULD BE NOTIFIED ONE YEAR IN ADVANCE. BUT THE ALLIANCE HAS AGREED TO PROPOSE IN THE CSCE, THAT MAJOR MANOEUVRES WOULD BE NOTIFIED (VOLUNTARILY) NO MORE THAT 60 DAYS IN ADVANCE. WHAT IS THE REASON FOR THIS INCONSISTENCY?

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5. THE DEFINITIONS OF "MAJOR EXERCISES" IN THE PAPER ARE INCONSISTENT: THEY RANGE FROM AN EXERCISE WHICH EXCEEDS 10,000 MEN (II, I(A) AND (IV, I) TO ONE WHERE THE AGGREGATE GROUND FORCE ELEMENTS EXCEEDS 35,000 OR 50,000 PERSONNEL (III,I(A)). THESE DEFINITIONS NEED TO BE CLARIFIED.

6. THE US PAPER PRESUMABLY REFERS TO GROUND FORCES ONLY. IF AIR FORCES WERE TO BE INTRODUCED INTO MBFR A DIFFERENT SET OF STABILISING MEASURES MIGHT BE NEEDED. PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA

7. THIS MEASURE ACCORDS WITH SACEUR'S VIEW THAT CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE AIMED AT MOVEMENT INTO THE GUIDELINES AREA. WE BELIEVE

THAT THIS MEASURE SHOULD PROVIDE THE ALLIANCE WITH CLEAR INTEL-
LIGENCE ADVANTAGES. WE CAN THEREFORE SUPPORT ITS APPLICATION TO
US AND SOVIET FORCES (THOUGH NOT TO BRITISH FORCES IN PHASE II).
BUT AS DRAFTED THE TEXT TAKES NO ACCOUNT OF US REFORGER
AND THE DEGREE OF DETAIL ENVISAGED SEEMS EXCESSIVE: SUCH COMPLEX
ARRANGEMENTS COULD GENERATE MISUNDERSTANDING NOT THE OPPOSITE.
PARAGRAPH 6 OF PART 1 IS OBSCURE EVEN IF THE FIGURE 10 IN 6(A) AND
(B) SHOULD BE 10 PER CENT.
PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR EXERCISES

8. THIS MEASURE SEEMS OF DOUBTFUL MILITARY VALUE. THE DETAILED
ARRANGEMENTS SUGGESTED WOULD IMPOSE ON NATO COMMANDERS CONSI-
DERABLE ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN (ABOUT WHICH SACEUR MAY HAVE
VIEWS) FOR A LIMITED INTELLIGENCE RETURN. IT DOES NOT APPEAR
TO CONFORM WITH SACEUR'S JUDGEMENT THAT NATO MOVEMENTS WITHIN
THE GUIDELINES AREA SHOULD BE AS UNCONSTRAINED AS POSSIBLE.
LIMITS OF SIZE, LOCATION, NUMBERS AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES

9. WE DISLIKE THIS MEASURE, WHICH MIGHT WELL IMPOSE MORE SEVERE
CONSTRAINTS ON THE ALLIANCE THAN ON THE WARSAW PACT. WE DISLIKE
IN PARTICULAR THE PROPOSAL THAT EXERCISES SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE
WITHIN 50 KILOMETRES OF CERTAIN SPECIFIED BORDERS. THIS WOULD
IMPLY THE SETTING UP OF SPECIAL ZONES OF CONTROL IN EUROPE.
EXCHANGES OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES

10. NATO MILITARY COMMANDERS MIGHT NOT FIND IT EASY TO ACCEPT
THE PERMISSIVE ARRANGEMENTS CONTEMPLATED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF PART
IV: SACEUR MAY HAVE VIEWS. THIS MEASURE COULD GENERATE MORE
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FRICTION THAN GOOD WILL IF (UNLIKE THE MEASURES PROPOSED IN THE
CSCE) IT WERE MADE MANDATORY. ITS MILITARY ADVANTAGES ARE LIKELY
TO BE MARGINAL, AS WOULD RELATE IN ANY CASE ONLY TO AN INCREASE
IN OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET FORCES. THERE IS
NO MILITARY CASE FOR EXTENDING
THE APPLICATION TO NON SOVIET, OR NON US FORCE.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 02 APR 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: mcintyresh
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973NATO05672
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731165/abqcedmc.tel
Line Count: 152
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: USNATO 5522
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: mcintyresh
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16-Jul-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <27-Aug-2001 by mcintyresh>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: CONTINUING UK CRITICISM OF STABILIZING MEASURES
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO BONN
LONDON
VIENNA
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005